RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Departing from the old principles of the common law, equity, in
imitation of the Continental systems of jurisprudence, has gradually
extended the scope of donations, till now, if Kekewith. vs. Manning be supported, they comprehend every possible species of
property. We may be permitted to doubt whether the new doctrine
can be safely or practically applied, unless its correlative in these
systems of jurisprudence, an extensive power of revocation given
to the donor, no matter how complete the gift, be also adopted.
The one without the other seems unnatural and absurd.
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Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1852.
THE PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD COMPANY Vs.
ELIAS H. DERBY.
1. A passenger carried gratuitously, or as a matter of courtesy, in the cars of a
Railroad Company, who is injured by an accident arising from the gross negligence of the servants of the Corporation, is entitled to recover against the latter.
2. Quwre whether the Corporation would not be also liable in a case of simple
negligence?
3. That a passenger injured by an accident occasioned by the negligence of the
servants of a Railroad Company, is also a stockholder therein, will not affect his
right to damages.
4. A master is liable for the negligence of -his servant in the course of his employment, though the particular act be contrary to express, orders.
5. D., a stockholder in a Railroad Corporation, was on the road of the latter by invitation of the President, not in the usual passenger cars, but in a small locomotive car used for the convenience of the officers of the Company, and paying
no fare for his transportation A collision occurred with another engine telonging to the same Company, which was by gross negligence, and contrary to express
orders given to the driver, on the same track, moving in the opposite direction;
and in this accident, D. received serious injury. Held, that he was entitled to
recover in case, against the Company.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
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The opinion of the Court was deliveredby
,GRIER, J.-This action was brought by Derby, the plaintiff
below, to recover damages for an injury suffered on the railroad of"
the plaintiffg in error. The peculiar facts of the case involving the
questions of law presented for our consideration, are these:
The plaintiff below was himself the President of another Rail-

road Company, and a stockholder in this. He was on the road of
defendants, by invitation of the President of the Company, not in
the usual passenger cars, but in a small locomotive ear used for the
"convenience of the officers of the Company, and paid no fare for
his transportation. " The injury to his person was caused by coming
into collision with a locomotive and tender in the charge of an
agent or servant of the Company, which was on the same track,
and moving in an opposite direction. Another agent of the
Company, in the exercise of proper care and caution, had giveA
orders to keep this track clear. The driver of the colliding engine
acted in disobedience and disregard of these -orders, and thus
caused the collision.
The instructions given by the Court below, at the instance of
plaintiff, as well as those requested by the defendant, and refused
by the Court, taken together, involve but two distinct points, which
have been the subject of exception here, and are in substance as
follows:
1. The Court instructed the jury, that if the plaintiff was lawfully on the road at the time of the collision, and the collision and
consequient injury to him were caused by the gross negligence of
one of the servants.of the defendants, then and there employed on
the road, he is entitled to recover, notwithstanding the circumstances given in evidence and relied upon by defendants' counsel as
forming a defence to the action, to wit: that the plaintiff was a
stockholder in the Company, riding by invitation of the President
.- paying iao fare, Abd not in the usual passenger cars, &c.
2. That the fact that the engineer having the control of the colliding locomotive, was forbidden to run on that track at the time,
and had acted in disobedience of such orders, was not a defence to
the action.
I
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1st. In support of the objections to the first instruction, it is
alleged "that no cause of action can arise to any person by reason
of the occurrence of an unintentional injury, while, he is receiving
or partaking of any of those acts of kindness which spring from
mere social relations; and that as there was no contract between
the parties, express or implied, the law would raise no duty as
between them, for the neglect of which an action can be sustained."
In support of these positions, the case between inn-keeper and
guest have been cited, such as 1 Rolls. Abr. 3,where it is said,
"If a host invite one to supper, and the night being far spent, he
invites him to stay all night, and the guest be robbed, yet the host
shall not be .chargeable, because the guest was nof a traveler," and
Cayles' case, 4 Rep. 52, to the same effect, showing that the peculiar liability of an inn-keeper arises from the consideration paid
for his entertainment of travelers, and does not exist in the case
of gratuitous lodging of friends or guests. The case of Farwell
vs. The Boston and WKrcester B. B. Co., (4 Metcalf, 47) has also
been cited, showing that the master is not liable for an injury received by one of his servants, in consequence of the carelessness
of another, while both are engaged in the same service.
But we are of opinion that these cases have no application to the
present. The liability of the defendants below for the negligent
and injurious act of their servant, is not necessarily founded'on
any contract or privity- between the parties, nor affected by any relation, social or otherwise, which they bore to each other. It is
true, a traveler by stage coach or other public conveyance, who is
injured by the negligence of the drivef, has an action against the
owner, founded on his contract to carry him safely. But the
maxim of "respondeat superior," which by legal imputation makes
the master liable for the acts of his servant, is wholly irrespective
of any contract, express or implied, or any other relation between
the injured party and the master. If one be lawfully on the street
or highway, and another's servatit carelessly drives a stage or
carriage against him and injures his property or person, it is 'no
answer to an action against the master for such injury, either, that
the plaintiff was riding for pleasure, or that be was a stockholder
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in the road, or that he had not paid his toll, or that he was the
guest of the defendant, or riding in a carriage borrowed from him,
or that the defendant was the friend, benefactor, or brother of the
plaintiff. These arguments arising from the social or domestic relations of life may, in some cases, successfully appeal to the feelings of the plaintiff, but will usually have little effect where the
defendant is a corporation, which is itself incapable of such relations, or the reciprocation of such feelings.
In this view of the case, if the plaintiff was lawfully on the road
at the time of the collision, the Court were right in instructing the
jury that none of the antecedent circumstances, or accidents of his
situation, could affect his right to recover.
It is a fact peculiar to this case, that the defendants who are
liable for the act of their servant coming down the road, are also
the carriers who were conveying the plaintiff up the road, and that
their servants immediately engaged in transporting the plaintiff
were not guilty of any negligence, or in fault for the collision.
But wewould not have it inferred from what has been said, that
the-circumstances alleged in the first point would affect the -case, if
the negligence which caused the injury, had been committed by the
agents of the company who were in the immediate care of the engine
and car in which the plaintiff rode, and he was compelled to rely on
those counts of his declartion founded on the duty of the defendant
to cariy him safely. This duty does not. result alone from the
consideration paid for the service. It is imposed by the law even
"The confidence induced by
where the service is gratuitous.
undertaking any service for another, is a sufficient legal consideration to create a duty in the performance of it." (See Cogg8 vs.
Barnard,and cases cited in 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 95.) It is
true a distinction has been taken in some cases between simple
negligence and great or gross negligence; and it is said that one
who acts gratuitously is liable only for the latter. But this case
does not call upon us to define the difference, (if it be capable of
definition) as the verdict has found this to be a case of gross negligence.
When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but
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dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require that
they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence. And
whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary, or
otherwise, the personal safety of the passengers should not be left
to the sport of chance or the negligence of careless agents. Any
negligence in such cases may well deserve the epithet of "gross."

In this view of the case, also, we think there was no error in the
first instruction.
2. The second instruction involves the question of the liability
of the master where the servant is in the course of his employment,
but in the matter complained of, has acted contrary to the express
command of his master.
The rule of "respondeat 8uperior," or that the master shall be
civilly liable for the tortious acts of his servant, is of universal application, whether the act be one of omission or commission, whether
negligent, fraudulent, or deceitful. If it be done in the course of
his employment, the master is liable; and it makes no difference
that the master did not authorize, or even know of the servant's
act or neglect, or even if he disapproved orforbade it, he is equally
liable, if the act be done in the course of his servant's employment,
(see Story on Agency, § 452. Smith on Master and Servant, 152.)
There may be found, in some of the numerous cases reported on
this subjeat, dicta, which, when severed from the context, might
seem to countenance the doctrine that the master is not liable, if
the act of his servant was in disobedience of his orders.. But a
more careful examination will show that they depended on the
question, whether the servant at the time he did the act complained
of, was acting in the course of his employment, or in other words,
whether he was or was not at the time in the relation of servant to
the defendant.
The case of Heath vs. Wilson, (9 Car. and Payne 607,) states.
the law in such cases distinctly and correctly.
In that case a servant having his master's carriage and horses in
his possession and control, was directed to take them to a certain
place; but instead of doing so he went in another direction to deliver a parcel of his own, and in returning drove, against an old26
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woman and injured her. Here the master was held liable for the
act of the servant, though at the time he committed the offence he
was acting in disregard of his master's orders; because the master
had intrusted the carriage to his control ahd care, and in driving it
he was acting in the course of his employment. Mr. Justice Erskine remiarks in this case: "It is quite clear, that if a servant
without his master's knowledge, takes his master's carriage out of
the coach-house, and with it commits an injury, the master is not
answerable, and on this ground, that the master has not intrusted
the servant with the carriage; but whenever the master has intrusted the servant With the control of the carriage, it is no answer,
that the servant acted improperly in the management of it. If it
wdre, it might be contended that if a mfaster directs his servanit to
drive slowly, and the servant disobeys his orders, and drives fast,
and through his negligence occasions an injury, the master will not
be liable. But that is not the law: the master in such a case will
be liable, and the ground is,. that he has put it in the servant's
power to mismanage the carriage, by intrusting him with it."
Although among the numerous cases on this subject, some may
be found, (such as the case of Lamb vs. Polk, 9 Carr. and Payne
.629,) in which the Court have made'some distinctions which 'are
Tather subtle and astute, as to when the servant may be said to be
acting in the employ of his master; yet we find no case which
asserts the doctrine that a master is not liable for the acts of a
servant in his employment, when the particular act causing the
injury was done in disregard of the general orders or special *command of the master. Such a qualification of the maxim of retpondeat superior, would in -a .measure, nullify it. A large proportion
,of the accidents on railroads are caused by the negligence of the
servants or agents of the company. Nothing but the most stringent enforcement of discipline, arid the most exact and perfect
obedience to every rule and order emanating from a superior, can
insure safety to life and property. The intrusting such a poVerful
and dangerous engine as a locomotive, to one who will not submit
to control, 'and render implicit obedience to orders, is itself an act
*of negligence; the "causa causans" of the mischief; while the
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proximate cause, or the ipsa negligentia which produces it,'may
truly be said, in most cases, to be the disobedience of orders by the
servant so intrusted. .If such disobedience could be set up by a
railroad company as a defence, when charged with negligence, the
remedy of the injured party would in most cases be illusive, discipline would be relaxed, and the danger to the life and limb of the
traveler greatly enhanced. Any relaxation of the stringent policy
and principles of the law affecting such cases, would be highly detrimental to the public safety.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

In the District Court of the United States, Western District of
Pennsylvania, January, 1853, in Admiralty.
JAMES FOSTER, et

al.

vs. STEAMBOAT PILOT,

No. 2.

1. A seaman who is at the same time a part owner of the vessel in which he serves,
is not thereby precluded from libelling in Admiralty for wages.
2. ALand B. were, with others, part owners of a vessel, and also served on board
her as mariners. The vessel was sold on execution out of a State Court, on a
judgment against all the owners. Hd4, that the sale not affecting the liens of
seamen, A. and B. might libel the vessel in the hands of the purchaser at Sheriff's
sale, for wages due prior thereto, notwithstanding the former part ownership.
3. The seaman's lien for wages is not discharged by a sale on execution against the
owners of a vessel.

Libel for wages-the facts and arguments in this case appear in
the opinion of the Court.
Mr. Pinney, for the Libellant.
M31r. Stanton, for the Respondent.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
IRWIn, J.-On the 7th day of December last, several bifls were
filed by James Foster and others, for wages alleged to be due them
as mariners of the Steamboat Pilot, No. 2, belonging to the port of
Pittsburg. On the same day, the Marshal seized the vessel by
process in favor of said libellants, and has since held it in custody
to answer their claims, and to await the adjudication of this
Court. Prior to the time when the said libels were filed and the
attachments served, the said steamboat was taken ii execution
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by the Sheriff of Allegheny County, upon judgmients obtained in
the District Court of said County, against the owners, and after
due notice, it was on the 18th day of December publicly sold by
the said Sheriff to B. McBride, for the sum of, seven hundred and
sixty dollars.
On the 21st of December, the said McBride, as intervenor,
answered the several libels, from which it appears that as purchaser
at Sheriff's sale, he claims to hold the said steam vessel discharged
from any lien which may have existed prior to the sale, and from
the claims of the libellants, who are denied to have been mariners
in said vessel, as is asserted in the said libels, which, therefore, he
prays may be dismissed, and the libellants condemned in costs. &c.
At the hearing, no proof was offered in support of the latter
allegation, but it was contended that two of the libellants, named
Alexander Woods and Jacob Gallatin,'whose claims for wages
amounted to the sum of five hundred and eighteen dollars and sixtythree cents, were before and after the voyage last made by the
steamboat,. and at the tine of filing their several libels, its part
owners,. and that the judgment and execution upon which it was
sold, were, against, the said Woods and Gallatin, as well as against
the-other part owners, and that therefore they have no lien thereon
for wages or otherwise.. So much of the answer as alleges the part
ownership of the vessel by Woods and Gallatin" at the time mentioned, is admitted to be true, but it is denied that their claim as
mariners of the said vessel for wages due, and their lien as
such mariners can in any manner be affected by such part ownership.
This is the only question for consideration.
There are principles of law governing mercantile partnerships,
which in argument are, supposed to involve and settle the points
raised by the answer adversely to the*claim of the libellants. Bt#
it'is unnecespary to -inquire what would have been the legal effect
of the disputed claims, if creditors of the partners ,of the steam
vpssel claiming by liens, inferior to that of -wages, or claiming in
pqsonam, had intervened to contest the claimp for wages, or to inquire whether part owners, not parties to the libel, could successfully intervene to resist the claims for wages of their copartners,
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on the ground that such claims, like all other claims between partners in relation to services to the partnership, or connected with
the partnership property, can only legally be adjusted and determined according to the law of partnership. Neither creditors nor
part owners have intervened, but had either or both events occurred,
it must not be inferred that such intervention, under the circumstances supposed, would be regarded as a legal obstacle to the
mariner's claims for wages. It is not meant, however, to say more
than what properly belongs to the case under consideration, as it
may be affected by the proofs exhibited, the principles of maritime
law, and as in principle it is distinguished from that assumed in
argument.
The respondent is a purchaser of the steam vessel subject to liens
for mariner's wages, and as no one else has intervened to contest those
liens, the inquiry will be confined to what he has set forth in his
answer as above noticed, and the proofs and the law which sustain
the claims of the libellants.
The claim of mariner's wages has a priority above all other
claims against the vessel, the freight, and the proceeds of both
into whose ever hands they may come. It is a permanent lien, and
secures to the mariner for his wages, a preference above all other
persons, and may be enforced in Admiralty against a bonafide purchaser, without regard to the title through which the purchaser
claims. The respondent purchased the steam vessel at Sheriff's
sale, eleven days after it had been libelled, and was in custody of
the Marshal, and while the libellants were proceeding in this Court
to enforce their liens. He cannot therefore allege with truth, that
when he purchased her he had no legal notice of these claims.
But with or without notice, if all the libellants were mariners, and
were all entitled to wages, their lien against the vessel, after as
well as before sale, is unquestionable. But whilst this is not denied
as a general principle, it is contended that two of the libellants,
though they might have been as alleged, employed as mariners in
the vessel, yet as part owners of it, they could not by any known
principles of law, proceed by libel in Admiralty for the recovery of
wages; that all the owners of the vessel were debtors for wages,
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and all equally liable; that the libellants could not- separate themselves from other part owners, and assdrt a separate claim against
the partnership property, which, in effect, would be to claim against
themselves as well as against their copartners, nor could they claim
against a bonafide purchaser of the partnership property under ajudicial sale; that such claims- for services to the partnership in a steam
vessel or otherwise, might be met with similar or equally good
claims by other part owners, and that their separate or mutual charges
and accounts can only be legally settled by the law of partnership.
It was further urged that, if part owners of a vessel had in admiTalty a lien for wages as mariners, the right would extend to all
other admiralty liens to the exclusion of creditors, and thus open a
door to fraudulent claims, which, in most instances, it would be
impossible to expose, or successfully resist. The argument in this
case is specious, but unsound. The owners of a steam vessel must
from necessity, in a voyage of that vessel, be subject to mariner's
wages; and, if it should happen that one of their number should be
employed as a mariner, such employment would be in a capacity
distinct from, and uncounected with, the appropriate business of a
partnership of that nature, the object of which is either to let ihe
vessel out to freight, or for mutual adventure in vessel and cargo.
As one of the crew, his name would regularly be included in the
shipping articles for the voyage; and, either by them or other contract, his station and rate of wages would be determined; and while
subject to all the penalties and forfeitures prescribed by the Act
of Congress for a failure to perform his duties as a mariner, he
would, as such, be entitled to the stipulated wages, and the triple
remedy which the law provides for enforcing its payment :-a lien
upon the vessel, the freight, and the proceeds of both, regardless
of partnership relations and liabilities, unless by express contract
another way of securing his wages had been provided. Without
,such an agreement, it would be fair to infer that his copartners in
a vessel regarded his right to wages as unconnected with, and
beyond the control of, the partnership. In pursuing the remedy
by libel, it would, therefore, be enough for the libellant to show, by
the shipping articles or otherwise, that he shipped as a mariner,
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and, as such, was entitled to wages, and that his wages were due,
and unpaid. The Act of Congress, which secures this right, is in
accordance with the policy and usages of maritime law, which
regards, with peculiar favor and tenderness, the situation of seamen, by giving them a lien for wages paramount to all other claims,
and a summary remedy for enforcing the right, unaffected by collateral matters, or common law pleadings. But whatever doubt
there may be as to the remedy, when a vessel is owned by several
in strict partnership, there can be none in a case where they are
merely part owners, as the respondents are alleged to be in the
answer, and as they must be taken to be in the absence of all controlling circumstances. The general relation of part owners of a
vessel, is that of tenants in common and not as copartners; they
are, $herefore, not liable in solido, nor entitled, in the settlement
of their accounts, to be governed by the principles of partnership.
.Nicholsvs. 1funford, 4 John. Chan. R. 522 ; 2 John. 611. There
are exceptions, but this case is not one of them; and as liens may
arise, either from express or implied assignments, it is but a reasonable presumption, when not opposed by special or express contract, that part owners do not intend to rely solely upon the personal responsibility of each other, to reimburse themselves for
expenses and charges incurred upon the common property for the
common benefit, but that there is a mutual understanding that they
shall possess a lien in rem. Story's Partn. 444.
The navigation of the western waters by steamboats is often
attended with more than ordinary risk and loss; to lessen such
risk, it is not unusual for those about to engage in such business to
unite in partnership with one or more persons, known to be skillful
and trustworthy mariners, whose interest in the vessel, though
generally small, is always sufficient to call into action the greatest
amount of vigilance, ability, and care of which they are capable,
an advantage which it would be vain to expect from mariners,
bound to their duty only by the prospect of ordinary wages.
The law, as explained, harmonizes with this policy, by giving to
a mariner, though a part owner of a vessel, a maritime lien for his
stipulated wages, while it does no injustice to another part owner,
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or to their creditors, since it adds nothing to the wages which must
necessarily be incurred in a voyage.. The creditors are generally
such as have claims for repairs to a vessel, or for materials furnished, a~d have often no other security for payment than the lien
which the law gives them upon the vessel. Both part owners and
creditors- have a deep interest in its safe return; and when, to the
usual means' of promoting that object, is superadded the connection
of mariner and part owner, it may be safely assumed, that it would
be impolitic, unjust and contrary to the principles of maritime law,
to deny to the mariner his claim for wages. Upon full consideration, made the more necessary from the absence of a reported case
of-a similar nature, I feel satisfied that the claims of the libellants
are fully sustained by the proofs and the law.
Decree accordingly.

In the Supreme Court of Rhode Iland.'
NATHAN WAPREN, JR. ET. AL., APPELLANTS, VS. MARY HARDING.

Where a man, who was by profession a mariner, made his will in the Delaware
river on board a steamer, which was towing down said river a vessel in which he
was to sail as a passenger to Chagres, there to take command of a lighter to

lighten vessels arriving in the river, it was held that the will was not within the
exception in favor of mariners at sea, the testator being at the time of its execution a passenger audnot a mariner in service, and being on his way to engage in

a business, which was not that ofamariner atsea.

An appeal from a decree of the Municipal Court of the City of
Providence, proving and approving a certain writing as the last
will and testament of Thomas A. Harding. The writing, purporting to be the will of said Thomas, was by him signed, and subscribed by Jacob .Albertson, as witness, and was admitted to probate as the will of a seaman at sea. The appellants appealed from
1his decree on the ground, first, that said Court had no jurisdiction,
the said Thomas having been at the time of his death an inhabi1

Reported in 2 R. L Rep. 183.

We are indebted to Thomas Durfee, Esq., State

Reporter, for this case, in advance of the publication of the volume.
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tant of the town of Bristol, and administration having been granted
on his estate by the Court of Probate of said Bristol, before the
probate of said will by said Municipal Court; and, second, that
said paper was not executed with the formalities required by the
statute in executing wills, and that, at the time of its execution,
said Thomas was not a mariner or seaman at sea and did not intend
to make the same, as such will.
It appeared in proof, that Thomas A. Harding was born in
Bristol, of which town, it was not disputed, he had been an inhabitant until within a few years of his death. From the age of six-'
teen until his death, he had been by profession a mariner, and
saving about seventeen months, had been constantly abroad in pursuance of his calling as such. At the time the will was executed,
said Thomas was on board the steamer Henlopen in the Delaware
river. The steamer was towing the schooner Zachary Taylor from
Philadelphia to the Delaware Breakwater, from whence said
schooner was bound to Chagres, and said Thomas was to go and
did go in her as a passenger to Chagres, whither he was going to
take charge of a lighter to lighten vessels arriving in Chagres river,
in pursuance of a contract between him and Messrs. Howland &
Aspinwall, of New York. The will was executed between Philadelphia and Lewistown, and, after the execution, the steamer
anchored off Lewistown and said Thomas went ashore, the steamer
remaining at anchor during the night. The will was dated May
14th, 1849, and the testator died in the Chagres river, in August,
1849.
There was much contradictory evidence put in on both sides to
prove the residence of the testator, which is considered in the
opinion of the Court.
Hoppin for the appellee, cited 2 Black. Commentaries, p. 501.
' In the goods of Coy," 7 Eng. Ec. R. 341, 375, 522.
Blake for the appellant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GREENE; C. J.-The first question to be settled is -hether the
testator had his domicil in Providence or Bristol at the time he
made his will. The evidence on this subject is conflicting. Bris-
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tol was his native place, and, it is agreed, was his home at the
death of his wife and for some time after. He was from home the
greater part of his time. He was at home in 1847 and in 1849.
He seems to have expresed himself to his Bristol friends one way,
and to his Providence friends another way, as to where he intended
to make his home. After a careful examination of all the evidence,
we do not find sufficient evidence of any change of domicil from
Bristol to Providence.
But as the case has been fully argued upon its merits, we have
thought it for the benefit of all parties to announce the opinio n we
have formed and thus prevent future litigation.
'The testator took passage on board the steamboat Henlopen at
Philadelphia, for the Delaware Breakwater, where he embarked on
board the schooner Zachary Taylor for -Chagres, as passenger, and
arived at that port. He.was employed by Howland & Aspinwall
of New York to go to Chagres, for the purpose of taking command
of a lighter vessel, to lighten vessels bound up the river to Chagres.
He made his will while on board the Henlopen, and after he sailed
from Philadelphia. The Henlopen towed the Zachary Taylor to
the Delaware Breakwater, and thence the latter vessel sailed for
Chagres.
The will, being attested by only one witness, is not entitled to
probate, unless it comes within the proviso which excepts the wills
of seamen at sea and soldiers in actual service from the general
operation of the statute.--Dig. of 1844, p. 232, § 4.
The testator was a master mariner by profession. The counsel
for the executor contends that the business, in which he was to be
employed on his arrival at Chagres, was that of a seaman at sea,
and, being in the employ of Howland & Aspinwall on his passage
to Chagres to be employed in that business, he is to be deemed a
seaman at sea, just as much as he would be after his arrival at
Chagres, and the commencement of the service he was to be engaged
in there.
Now, in the first place, we do not think that as captain of a
lighter vessel in the river, lighting vessels to that port, he could be
considered a seaman at sea. But if this were otherwise, and his
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employment after his arrival at Chagres, was on a voyage across
the Atlantic, still we think while. a passenger on board, the Henlopen and the Zachary Taylor, he was not a seaman at sea. The
meaning of these words is a seamen employed as such at sea. If
he had been one of the seaman on board the Zachary Taylor, he
would be considered as at sea, as soon as she sailed from the wharf
at Philadelphia, and this whether at the time of making his will he
was on board the Henlopen or the Zachary Taylor, the two vessels
being fastened together and the Henlopen towing the Zachary
Taylor.
The difficulty is not in the place where the will was made, but in
the fact that the testator was not at the time of making it a seaman
in the sense of the statute, any more than he was in his passage in
the cars from Providence to Stonington, and thence in the steamboat to New York, and thence in the cars to Philadelphia.
Decree of the Municipal Court reversed.

Supreme Court, New York.

Monroe General Term.'

DANIEL W. BUELL VS. AARON BISSELL, ADMXINISTRATOR,

ETC., OF

ALEXANDER BISSELL, DECEASED.
1. The payee of a gromissory note, who transfers it for a valuable consideration,
though after its maturity, impliedly warrants that it is not void for usury.
2. The ground of implied warranty, either of title or quality, at common law, is the
presumed superior knowledge of the vendor; per SELDEN, J.
3. A., the payee of an overdue note, transferred it for a valuable consideration to
D., who sued on it; but the defence of usury being interposed by the maker,
the latter had judgment, with costs. D. then brought an action against the administrator of A. for the amount paid on the sale of the note; held, that he
was entitled to recover.
4. Held, also, that he might have not only the defendant's, but his own costs in the
prior action ; quwre whether he was not entitled also to counsel fees therein.

The plaintiff sold to Alexander Bissell, the defendant's intestate,
a lot of land, and received, in part payment therefor, a promissory
1WELLES, JOHNSON, and SELDEN, Justices.
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note, executed by one Richardson to the said intestate, for the sum
of two hundred and thirty-six dollars and ninety cents. The 'note
fell due before its transfer to the plaintiff. Nothing was said at
the time of the transfer on the subject of a defence to the note.
In an action by the. plaintiff, against Richardson the maker, to
recover' the amount of the note, the latter set up the defence of
usury. Upon the trial the defence was established, and the defendant, Richardson, obtained a judgment against the plaintiff for the
costs of the suit, which the plaintiff paid.
This action was brought to recover the amount of the note, and
the costs of prosecuting the suit upon it, together with the costs so
recovered by and paid to Richardson. The referee, before whom
the cause was tried, reported in favor of the plaintiff for the full
amount claimed; and the defendant now moves to set aside this
report, and for, a new trial.
SELDEN, J.-The main question presented in this case is, whether
the payee of a note, who transfers it for a valuable consideration,
impliedly undertakes that the note is not void for usury.
I am not aware that this question has been settled by any direct
adjudication. It is to be governed, therefore, by the principles
which have been judicially applied to analogous cases.
The dobtrine that in every sale of a chattel there is an implied
warranty on the part of a vendor that he is the Q ner of the property and has a right to convey, is derived both from the common
and the civil law, and has never been disputed. It is founded in
the obvious justice of the case. The vendor is presumed to be cognizant of his own title. The vendee, not having the same means
of knowledge, must necessarily trust to the representations of the
vendor.
The rule in question therefore requires no more from the vendor
than a guaranty that he is not committing a fraud. But, in respect
to the obligations of the seller as to the quality of the article sold,
there is a great diversity not only between the civil and the common law, but among the different tribunals, whose decisions are
professedly based upon the latter. Thus the civil law held, that
every contract of sale included a warranty, not only against those
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material defects, which would either destroy, or materially impair
the utility of the article sold for the purpose for which it was
bought, but against every other defect, except such as were either
of that obvious kind, that would not be likely to escape the attention of a careful buyer, or could be shown, by direct proof, to have
been within his knowledge.
On the other hand, the common law applies the maxim, caveatemptor, to most cases of sale. By the general principles of that
law, unless a purchaser exacts an express warranty as to the qualities of the subject of the sale, no obligation attaches to the seller
in that respect, except in cases of fraud.
The common law courts, however, have been by no means uniform in their adherence to, or exposition of, this doctrine. I shall
not attempt a review of the numerous conflicting cases on the subject. It would be an onerous as well as unprofitable task. But I
will give a few thoughts, which have been suggested by a cursory
examination of some of the authorities.
It is obvious that Courts, as well as elementary writers, in the
rules which they have laid down in this question, have aimed to
follow certain plain principles of natural justice; and also that, in
the main, they concur in regard to those principles. The differences
among them seem to have arisen from their not adopting an analysis sufficiently close to develope and limit, with precision, the rules
they were seeking to expound or apply.
The question which lies at the threshold of this subject, and
without the definitive settlement of which we can come to no satisfactory conclusion, is this:What is the basis of every implied warranty on the part of a
vendor of goods, whether it be of the title to, or the qualities of,
the article sold?
Some able writers upon the civil law assume, that it is a necessary and inherent part of every contract of sale, that the seller
will cause the buyer to have the thing sold; and hence the obligation
of warranty on the part of the seller as to the title; and, from this
obligation, they deduce as its logical consequence, an implied warranty in all cases as to the qualitie8 of the article sold; because, as

414
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they say, "to be obliged to cause the buyer to have the thing in
the intention of the parties, is to cause him to have it usefuly."Pothier on Cont. of Sale, Sale, section 203.
This exposition, however, of the foundation upon which the doctrine of implied warranty rests, is liable to serious objections.
If such a warranty is an inherent part of every contract of sale,
or, which is the same; thing, of every transer of the title to property, unless otherwise agreed, why- does it not apply to ,judicial
sales, to sales by guardians of infants, by trustees of married
women, and many other cases, to which no one ever thought of
applying the doctrine.
It is true, we can see very good reasons why the Courts should
not in these cases, superadd by implication, an obligation to the
contract, whieh it would not otherwise contain; but the doctrine we
are contesting is, that'the contract itself embraces it; that it is
inherent in the very nature of the contract.
Again, upon this supposition, why should the obviousness of the
defect, or a knowledge of it by the purhcaser, prevent the warranty
in regard t6 the quality of the article from attaching. These circumstances are no answer to an express warranty, by either the civil
or the common law; and if the doctrine of Pothier is true, that
every contract of sale, ex vi termini, contains a warranty of the
quality as well as the title, why should they fiave any greater effect
in the one case than in the other; and yet there is no implied. warranty, even by the civil law, against such defects.
It is clear, I think, that some other ground must be sought for
this doctrine of implied warranty than that we have been consider-

ing.
The common law, as it seems to me, imposes the obligation upon
a vendor to make good the title, because it is fair and just to presume that he knew the nature and extent of his own right; and the
law, therefore, will not put the purchaser to the necessity of establishing'tis knowledge by proof, so as to charge the vendor with
a fraud; but, 'assuming superior knowledge as to the title on the
part of the vendor, it holds his liability to be absolute, and will not
permit this legal presumption to be rebutted by proof.
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It is a universal principle of justice, recognized alike by the civil
and the common law, that whenever a thing sold has some latent
defect, known to the seller but not to the purchaser, the former is
liable for this defect, unless he discloses his knowledge on the subject to the latter before, or at the time of, the sale.
The doctrine of implied warranty of title rests upon the same
principle. Its basis is the presumed knowledge, by the vendor, of
the circumstances affecting his own title; and hence, in the case of
judicial and other sales, where that presumption could not properly
be held to arise, no warranty is implied.
This warranty is not, therefore, a part of the contract itself, as
made between the parties, but is an obligation which the law annexes
thereto, in accordance with the demands of justice, when, and only
when the circumstances are such as to require it. Now, it is plain
that this principle is just as applicable in respect to the quality, as
to the title of the thing sold; that is, in a case where the circumstances authorize a presumption of superior knowledge by the
vendor, as to the quality, his responsibility should be the same as
in respect to the title. There is no reason for raising an implied
contract in the one case, which does not equally exist in the other.
For instance, one who sells an article of his own manufacture
may with propriety, nay, should be presumed to be cognizant of
any latent defect, arising from the peculiar process by which the
article is produced.
The English Courts, therefore, in holding that such cases are
exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor, have introduced no new
rule; but simply applied that plain principle of justice, which, in
respect to the title, has commanded universal assent.
Again, those cases both in the English and American courts,
which hold that sales by sample are also exceptions to the general
rule, rest upon the same principle.
The contract, in such oases, is not necessarily broader in its terms
than in others, but because the vendor alone has generally the
means of ,knowing whether the article sold corresponds to the
sample, and would, therefore, practice a fraud if it did not correspond, the law holds him responsible.
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The same is true of goods sold, and sent, pursuant to order, from
a distance.
Indeed, all cases, when the articles sold are not
present, and are not seen by the purchaser prior to the sale, are
exceptions to the general rule.
The nature of these exceptions, and the obvious reasons upon
which they must rest, point strongly to the principles for which I
'am contending; to wit, that the basis of every implied warranty
upon a sale, is the presumed superior knowledge of the vendor in
regard to the particular defect, whether it be a defect of title or in

quality.
I am aware that several of the cases in the English Courts, establishing these exceptions, have been somewhat severely commented
on in this State, in the case of Hart vs. Wright, 17 Wendell, 267.
S. C. 18 Wend. 449 ; and also in Waring, vs. Mason, 18 Wend.
426.
Among the cases thus censured are those of Gardinervs. Gray,
4 Camp. 144; Laing vs. .Fidgeon, 6 Taunt. 108; and Jones vs.
Bright, 5 Bingh. 533.
If, however, we look simply at what was really decided in those
cases, instead of the loose remarks of some of the judges, I think
we shall find no occasion for the strictures passed upon them.
The two first were both cases of sales by samples, where the purchaser neither saw, nor had an opportunity of seeing, the articles
until after the sales; and, when on trial, they were proved not to
correspond with the sample.
These decisions certainly accord
with several cases in our own Courts, and rest, as it seems to me,
upon the most solid basis of reason and justice.
Lord Ellenborough puts the case of Gardinervs. Gray upon the
true ground. He says, "When there is no opportunity to inspect
the commodity, the maxim of caveat emptor does not apply ;" page
145.
The case of Jones vs. Bright, was a case of the sale of a manufactured article by the manufacturer himse?f, in which there was
an intrinsic and latent defect, growing out of the process of manufacture.
The Court very properly, as I think, held that the vendor was
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liable. It is true there are dicta by some of the judges in this
case, that cannot be sustained; but the decision could not with
propriety have been different.
It is a little singular that this and some other English cases,
have been sometimes understood as seeking to establish the doctrine
that there was a difference between manufactured and other articles of trade, in respect to the responsibilities of, the vendor.
The case was not put upon any such ground, but, on the ground
that the defendant, being himself the manufacturer, might justly
be presumed to have better means of knowing those qualities which
resulted from the mode of manufacture, than the purchaser.
That this was the true reason of the decision is apparent. Mr.
Justice Park says, "But on the case itself I have no doubt, distinguishing as I do, between the manufacturer of an article and a
mere seller." (Page 546.)
The case of Gray vs. Fox (4 Barn. & Cress. 108) illustrates the
distinction. That case was similar to the last, except that the
defendant, instead of being the manufacturer, was one who bouglht
from the manufacturer and sold again. It was held that there was
no implied warranty, and for the reason here given, Chief Justice
Abbott says, "The defendants were copper merchants, not manufacturers." (Page 115.)
It is no objection to the view I have taken, that it will not
reconcile all the cases; because they are irreconcilable. It does
accord, as has been in part, and might be more fully shown, with
most of leading cases in England.
Those which cannot be reconciled with it, are cases in the
American Courts, which have wavered and fluctuated between the
doctrines of the civil and the common law. - Our view, however,
leaves no difference between the two systems, except in the single
case of a latent defect, of which both seller and purchaser are, for
aught that appears, mutually ignorant. The parties in such a case,
being equally innocent, there seems no reason in the abstract, for
visiting the loss upon one rather than the other; and we can trace
the reason for the opposite rules adopted, in what has been already
said; the civil law, regarding a warranty as incorporated into the
27
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contract of sale itself, as a necessary consequence held the vendor
liable; while the common law with, as I conceive, more consistency
and better logic, held, that where no warranty was expressed, and
no reason existed, in justice, why the law should raise one by
implication, there wag none.
The maxim of caveat emptor, followed as a logical consequence
from, or was the simple embodiment of this doctrine of the common
law, and was not the result of any profound consideration of the
effects to be produced upon society, or upon a commercial community, by thd principle, as has been sometimes supposed. This
maxim itself affords a strong argument that the common law has,
from its origin, taken the view of the doctrine of implied warranty,
which has been here presented.
The reasoning 'we have pursued has this merit,
at least, that it
gives a definite and clear rule, applicable to all cases, and one
which, if adopted, would tend to produce uniformity in the
decisions on this subject. It is decisive of the case before us.
The defendant's intestate having been the payee of the note,
and a party to the transactions out of which it grew, must be presumed to be cognizant of the facts which made the note usurious;
and upon the principles we have assumed, therefore, the law would
imply an undertaking on his part to guaranty against that defect.
The only remaining inquiry is, whether there was any error in
the allowance of the costs of the suit brought upon the notes.
If the positions already taken are correct, there can be no doubt
of the plaintiff's right to recover the costs taxed and recovered
agaiinst him in that suit.

The only question is, -whether the referee was warranted in allowing also the taxable costs of the prosecution.
I see no reason -whythe rule of damages adopted in actions upon
t~h covenant of *wtrantyin a deed of lands, is not applicable to
case lik
6 present.
It was held, in Rickert vs. Snyder, 9 Wend. 416, that, in an
action for breach of the covenant of warranty, the plaintiff, who
had been evicted, might be allowed not only his own taxable costs,
in addition to the costs recovered against him, but counsel fees also.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In this case only the taxable costs were allowed; and, in that
respect, it does not go as far as the rule laid down in Rickert vs.
Snyder would warrant.
My conclusion therefore is, that there is no error in the report
of the referee, and that the motion to set it aside must be denied.

District Court, City and Oounty of Philadelphia,March, 1852.
JOHN R. BREITENBACH vs. CHARLES B. DUNGAN etaL, EXECUTORS OF
ELIHU D. TARR,

GAINISHEE OF WILLIAM BOYER.

I. Where an estate to A, and his heirs, &c., is given in the premises of a deed, but
the word ' heir" is omitted in the habendum, the latter may be disregarded, and
A. will take an estate in fee.
2. It is no objection to an assignment for the benefit of creditors, stipulating a release, that the wife of a grantor does not join therein.

This was a motion for a rule for a new trial.
The facts of the case,-and the grounds of the motion sufficiently
appear in the opinion of the Court, which was delivered by
STROUD, J.-The plaintiff having obtained a judgment against
Boyer, issued an attachment execution upon it, in which the late
Elihu D. Tarr, Esq., was made a garnishee.
Boyer had made an assignment in trust for his creditors to Mr.
Tarr. This assignment contained a stipulation for a release. According to Thomas vs. Jenks, 5 Rawle, 221, and other decisions
since, such a stipulation renders the assignment fraudulent and void
as to non-assenting creditors, unless the whole of the assignor's
estate is conveyed by it.
The plaintiff, upon grounds to be mentioned presently, contended
that the assignment of Boyer did not convey the whole of his estate:
It was in evidence that Boyer owned both real and personal property. In the premises of the assignment the word heirs is used
in connection with the name of the assignee, but is omitted in the
habendum. This omission, it is argued, abridged the fee which
was conveyed by the premises.
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The authority for this position is the expression in Blackstone,
that the habendum may lesson the estate granted in the premises.
The meaning of this is to be found in the example which he gives,
viz: that if a grant be in the premises to A and his heirs, it may
be qualified by the habendum, by limitihg it to A and the heirs of
his body. In both instances the fee is conveyed, but the fee simple,
which is granted in the premises, is defined in the habendum, to be
an estate tail. In this there is no contradiction-nor does the law
allow a contradiction. This is expressly stated by Blackstone, and
he gives this illustration: "Had it been in the premises, to him
and his heirs, habendum, to him for life, the habendum would be
utterly void, for an estate of inheritance is vested in him before the
habendum comes, and shall not afterwards be taken away or di-vested by it," 2 B1. Com. 298. The language of Chief Justice
Tilghman on this subject, in Wager vs. Wager, 1 S. & R. 375, is
very clear and satisfactory. "One of the most important rules,"
he says, "in the construction of deeds is, so to construe them that
no part shall be rejected. The object of all construction is to
ascertain the intent of the parties, and it must have been their
intent to have some meaning in every part. It never could be a
man's intent to contradict himself, therefore we should lean to such
a construction as reconciles the different parts, and reject a construction which leads to a contradiction."
To say that after Boyer, in the 'premises, had granted an estate
in fee, he, in the habendum, intended that no inheritance should be
conveyed, would be to ascribe to him two opposite and contradictory
intentions. No authority, we believe, can be vouched for this.
In the Earl of Rutland's case, 8 Co. 112, Lord Chief Justice
Coke says, "it was resolved in Auditor King's case, that where
Queen Elizabeth granted a manor to B and his heirs, in the yremi8e8 of the letters patent, to have and to hold the said manor to B
and 1is assigns, (leaving out heirs in the habendum,) that the fee
of the manor did pass by the premises, and the habendum was void,
for the premises were certain enough to pass the fee simple, and
the omission of heirs in the habendum should not overthrow that
which was certain in the premises; which case was affirmed for
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good law, per totam curiam." This case is cited and approved by
Yeates, J., in Wager vs. Wager, supra.
This is, in substance, our case; we retain the premises but reject
the habendum. The omission of heirs in the latter ought, no doubt,
to be set down as a clerical mistake. But by disregarding the
)abendum altogether, the legal effect is the same.
The second objection is, that the wife of Boyer did not join in
the assignment. This, it is supposed, even if the word heirs was
found in both the premises and the habendum, would leave a portion
of the debtor's estate in him not conveyed by the assignment.
We do not agree to this view at all. The deed passed all the
estate of the husband, although his wife was not a party. It did
not, it is true, pass the wife's interest-her right of dower. But
that can in no sense be called his estate. Besides, what right had
he to expect his wife to surrender the interest which the law bad
given her in his real property, or what means are to be presumed
as within his power to induce her to join in the deed. Unless her
concurrence were voluntary, the act would be invalid, and.non
vonstat, that she was willing to join in the deed.
Both of the points which we have noticed were ruled on the trial
in accordance with our opinion here expressed, and we accordingly
refuse the rule for a new trial.
Rule refused.

Loziville Chancery Court, Kentucky, Oct., 1852.
HAYDON AND RODMAN VS. FIELD AND JONES.

1. A foreign attachment was levied on debts generally. The garnishees had given
to the defendant a blank bill of exchange, for a debt due him, on which bill they
had written their acceptance. Subsequently to the attachment, the defendant filled
up the blanks to his own order and endorsed the bill to a purchaser for value
without notice. Held, that the doctrine of Uspende did not apply; that the endorser of the bill took a good title; and that the garnishee was discharged.
2. A bill of exchange accepted, without any name of drawer or payee, is nevertheless a regular instrument by the Law Merchant; and the holder may, on a sale
thereof, fill up the blanks for the benefit of the purchaser, in good faith, and

when so filled, the bill will stand as though so made originally.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PIRTLE, CHANCELLOR.-This

is an attachment by Haydon and

Rodman, on the ground of the non-residence of Field, against a
general indebtment, alleged from the Louisville and Frankfort Rail
Road Company to Field and Jones. It turns out that the Company was indebted to them ind the sum of $4,343 15, and had in
payment thereof, given them a blank bill of exchange, as to the
drawer br payee, on the face of which their acceptance was written
by their president.
A few days after this attachment this bill of exchange was, for a
valuable consideration, sold to David A. Sayre, in Lexington, by
Field, who, at the time of the sale, filled.up the blanks with the
firm style of Field and Jones, as drawers, and M. D. Field as
payee, and endorsed it by writing his name, I'M. D. Field,"
upon it.
The attachment was not made of any special debt. It does not
'refer to this bill of exchange. There was no order injoining the
negotiation of this bill. It is not pretended that Sayre had any
notice of the pending of this suit.
By the Law Merchant, this bill so accepted, without a drawer's
name, and without the name of a payee, was regular, and the
aeceptance would be good in the hands of any bonafide purchaser
of the paper; and the blanks might be filled up according to the
facts of his bargain. And, on a purchase made of it, the party
transferring it had also, by the mercantile law, the right to fill up
the blanks for the benefit of the purchaser in good faith; and
when so filled, the bill would stand as if originally so made.
When this blank bill was shown to Sayre, it gave him no information that it had been made by the Rail Road Company for
any original debt owed by said Company to the party offering it to
hipa. He had as much right to infer that the bill had been made
for some other purpose; and that the party had obtained it from
some other person to whom it had been delivered by the Company,
or for some other holder in the way of commerce, even after this
suit was brought.
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Such being the law of this paper, what is the effect of this suit on
the bona fide holder, Sayre?
The general rule is, that a purchaser finding a suit with regard to the subject of sale, must hold subject to the suit. This is
a rule of necessity, and applies as well to such as purchase in
good faith, without actual notice of the suit, as to those who purchase with notice, or else the decrees and judgments of courts
might be rendered fruitless. But, as it is a rule that in the case
of a bonafide holder may work much hardships, the same public
policy that requires the rule, would seem to demand 'that the
li pendens should necessarily cover the subject of sale. Here,
if the purchaser had read the record of this suit as it stood at
the time of his purchase, he would not have seen that it certainly did include this bill of exchange. The policy of that law,
which says this blank bill was valid, that its blanks might be filled
by, or for any purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration, is
as well afforded to protect the mercantile community from imposition, by paper allowed to be thus circulated, as to uphold the effect
of suits in its Courts-each to be held in its appropriate regard.
Had there been a specific attachment of this debt, for which this
blank bill had been given, then the necessity to enforce it against
a bonafide purchaser, might have overcome the regard to be had
for such a purchaser in the mercantile community. I do not say
it would have done so. This paper might be taken in law as a
satisfaction of the original debt, and as making a new debt to any
one in the community who should pay his money for it without
notice. It may have been too volatile and intangible to be held
by attachment. It is not necessary to decide this now. It is
enough to consider that Sayre is not affected by this general
attachment, in the absence of an injunctioni against the circulation
of this bill.
The Rail Road Company in their answer, say-they werd indebted to Field & Jones obout $6000 or upwards, and that they
gave their acceptances to them in payment thereof, which they
have heard Field & Jones have negotiated, but do not know who
the holders are. The other bill was also in blank like this one,
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and whether it has been negotiated or not, does not appear. If
the attachment could reach the bill now in the hands of Sayre, it
is not seen why it might not reach the other bill; so that it would
not be just to Sayre, to put the whole burden on him. Yet, until
it does appear that the bill was not negotiated, no decree for the
money can be made against the Rail Road Company:
Wherefore it is decreed that the petition be dismissed, but without prejudice to any other suit against Field & Jones, and that the
complainants pay the Rail Road Company and said Sayre their
respectie costs herein expended.'
Speed & Worthington, for the plaintiff.
Bland Ballard, for Sayre.

Court of Oyer aud Terminer, PhiladelphiaCounty.
COMMONWEALTH v8. ARTHUR SPRING.
Where a person not returned on the venire answers for a juror who was returned,
and goes into the jury box and hears a capital case, and renders a verdict, assuming to be the juror actually summoned, a new trial will be granted.

Defendant was convicted of the murder of Ellen Lynch, and on
I In Kentucky, attachments against the effects of non-resident debtors, are issued
out of the Court of Chancery, which has also all the equity jurisdiction of the High
Court of Chancery in England. This decision of the Chancellor was taken to the
Court of Appeals, and affirmed on the 28th January, 1853.
The same point as that involved in the principal case, was decided by the Supreme
.Court of Pennsylvania, in Keiffer vs. Ehler, 18 Penn. St. R. (6 Harris) 388, where
it was held that an attachment-execution is unavailing against a bona fide holder of
negotiable paper, who obtains it after attachment, before maturity, and without
notice. It was observed, however, by his Honor, Judge Lowrie, in delivering the
opinion of the Court-" That the negotiation of such paper by a defendant, after he
has had notice of the attachment, is a fraud on the law, and we think that the Court
from which the attachment issues, has power to prevent this, by requiring the
instrunient to be placed in such a custody, as will prevent it from being misapplied,
taking care that it shall be demanded at maturity, and that proper notice be given
to the endorsers, if necessary, and that the money, if paid, shall stand in place of
the note or bill to abide the event"l-page 391.
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Saturday, March 26th, by Mr. Doran, his counsel, moved for a
new trial, and filed the following reasons:
1st. The trial was irregular, and the empanneling of the jury
irregular and contrary to law, inapmuch as Charles McQuillan,
who acted as a juror in the case, had never been dli
awn, summoned
and returned as such, but answered to the name of one Bernard
Corr, and as such was sworn and empanneled as a juror, a fact
unknown to the prisoner or his counsel until after the verdict.
2d. The verdict cannot be sustained, because Bernard Corr, who
was supposed to be one of the jury, did not act as such and unite in
the verdict.
April 2, 1853.-The opinion of the Court was delivered by
THomPsoN, P. J.-The verdict, which was the result of a protracted and patient investigation of this extraordinary case, seemed
so clearly indicated by the evidence, that it met an approving
response in the bosoms of all who had watched the progress of the
trial. It was, however, scarcely rendered, when the Court and
community were surprised to learn that an occurrence had taken
place upon the trial, upon which the prisoner could found an application for a new trial.
This application was made upon the ground that a person not
summoned as such, had assumed the name and acted in the place
of one of the regular jurors.
That any man claiming to be a citizen of this enlightened Republic, could be so stupid or so reckless as to thrust himself uncalled
into the jury box, and there assume to decide upon the fate of a
fellow being whose life was in peril, seems almost incredible. The
fact, however, is undenied, that Charles McQuillan, an entire stranger, undertook to answer to the name of Bernard Corr, a juror
regularly summoned. When Bernard Corr was called upon the
jury in this case, Charles McQuillan answered, was sworn as a
juror, sat upon the trial, and joined in the verdict, without the
Court being apprised of the error, and, as is allege'd, without the
knowledge of the prisoner.
This is the sole ground presented for the motion for a new trial.
In approaching the investigation of the principles involved in
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this motion, the Court has not been unaffected by the gravity of the
qubstion presented, and the extraordinary character of the case in
which it has arisen. We, like our fellow men, cannot be insensible
to the appalling atrocity of the crimes charged against the prisoner.
We cannot fail to observe the operation of that natural horror of
crime which has caused excited crowds to watch with intense anxiety the result of this trial, nor are we forgetful of the crushing
weight of that evidence under which the counsel for the prisoner, in
his argument upon this motion, admitted that his client must again
necessarily be convicted. But these are matters against which we
must close our mifids in considering the question before us-for
were Arthur Spring ten times the guilty wretch that the public
voice proclaims him, we as the sworn ministers of the law, are
bound to secure to him an impartial trial by a jury of his country.
The only question for us to consider is, has he had such a trial ?
.The law has carefully provided for.the selection and qualification
of jurors; it has thrown around the jury box all those guards
which seem calculated to insure its purity, and it gives to every
one charged with crime the right of trial by a jury composed of
twelve of his peers, selected in the manner specially directed.
Unless the requisition of the law, which provides' for the selection,
the summoning and empanneling of the jury be strictly complied
with, the prisoner has the right to take advantage of the irregularity. For his protection the law has given to him the right to challenge, which he may exercise either to the array or to the polls.
It supplies him with the names of the jurors who are to be summonedin his case, with such description of their pursuits and resi-dences as will fully enable him to judge of them, and to protect his
rigVs by rejecting any he deems obnoxious to him.
.With these safeguards thrown around him, a citizen is protected
from the influence of malice or design, and he is entitled to ask the
Courts by whom the law is administered, to afford the fullest protection to his rights. This protection the Court is always ready to
afford; but in. doing so, require the party himself to be watchful in
the care of his own interests. If before or during trial he omits or
neglects to challenge for a defect or irregularity which he might
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thus have taken advantage of, he cannot, after verdict, claim the
benefit of it.
The present case, however, is one in which the right to challenge
could not have protected the prisoner. The list of jurors summoned
contained no such name as Charles McQuillan. He presented himself unsummoned, assuming the name of a regular juror. His person was unknown to the prisoner. He could not know that the
juror upon whom he was required to look, was not Bernard Corr,
whose name this stranger had falsely assumed. His refusal to challenge him was a selection of Bernard Corr as one of his panel, not
an assent that McQuillan should be sworn. They were both equally
strangers to him, and his reliance upon the proper jury list placed
before him, for the true description of those who appeared in
answer to the names called, must not operate to his prejudice.
He had undoubtedly the right to be tried by twelve jurors regularly summoned. He has not been so tried. That he has not
waived any right is conceded; and yet he has been deprived of it.
It is not denied on the part of the prisoner, that if the defect in
the proceeding had been the subject of challenge, and not taken
advantage of by him in proper time, he would now be barred by
the Act of 21st February, 1814, having gone to trial. The provisions of that Act are applicable to criminal cases, (Com. vs. Dyott,
5 Wharton, 78,) and have, in a civil oause, been extended to a case
within the spirit, though not within the letter of the law. Burton
vs. Erlich, 8 Harris, 236. The circumstances or the latter case
are somewhat-similar to those of the present, but the fact, that in
that case the name of the party called as the juror, was different
from that of the person returned on the venire, was notice to the
parties, and enabled either of them to have had the juror's name
struck from the panel before going to trial, which they omitted to
do. This decision does not therefore aid us, nor if the facts were
even more similar would we be willing, in a case of the highest
penal character, to depend upon the authority of a civil case, to
meet the exigencies of which it was necessary to resort to the spirit
of the law, though confessedly beyond its letter. Neither the Act
of Assembly, nor the case cited, seem to meet the difficulty now
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presented. That it was not a trial by a jury regularly summoned,
is clear; and it is equally clear that the illegality has not been
waived by the prisoner. There has, therefore, been a mistrial, and
a verdict rendered by only eleven jurors. The important question,
then, presented is, whether after verdict, the prisoner can take advantage of this irregularity ?
The current of the English authorities in this question is not uniform, but the prevailing opinion seems' to be, that where such an
irregularity is noticed before the verdict is rendered, the party
objecting will be entitled to a new trial; but if not discovered until
after the verdict, it is too late to take advantage of it. It then
becomes a question for the discretion of the Court to grant or
refuse a new trial, if they believe injustice has been done in the
case.
If we could find that the rule has been fully established, to leave
it to the discretion of the Court to decide the question of a new
trial, upon the opinion entertained as to the justice of the case, the
present motion would be one of easy decision, as it has not been
suggested, even in argument, thlat any other verdict could or ought
to have been found under the evidence given. We have examined
this point with an anxious desire to sustain this verdict, if it could
be done without depriving the prisoner of his legal right, but utwilling, in a case of such magnitude, to rely upon any but well settled
principles.
In the early case of Norman vs. Beaumont, Willes, 484, where
the facts were precisely similar to those of the present case, a person not returned on the jury having answered for a juryman who
was returned, and the fact having been proved by affidavit, it was
the unanimous opinion of the .Court that the verdict should be set
aside. The note of a case in March's new Cases, p. 132, appears
to be a contrary decision, though the facts are not fully stated.
Th case of Hill vs. Yeates, 12 East, 229, decided in 1810, is
generally referred to as the ruling decision on this subject. There
the son of a juryman had answered to his father's name and served
upon the jury. On a motion to set aside the verdict, the case of
Norman vs. Beaumont was referred to, but Lord Ellenborough
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said, that he had mentioned the case to all the judges, they were
of opinion that it was within their discretion to grant or refuse a
new trial on such ground, and that if no injustice had -been done,
which was not pretended, they would not interfere, but leave the
party to get rid of the verdict as he might.
The case of Hill vs. 3-eates, is certainly fully in point, but an
examination of more recent cases shows that it has not always been
followed so as to have laid the foundation of an established rule.
In Dovey vs. Hobson, 6 Taunt. 400, the mistake was discovered
before verdict, and it was held that a venire de novo ought to be
granted for the mistrial, though the case of Hill vs. Yeates was
recognized as authority, in a case where the objection was after the
verdict.
A new trial was refused in The Queen vs. Sullivan, 8 Adol. &
Ellis, 831, because the defendants had the opportunity to challenge
and waived it.
In King vs. Tremearne, 5 B. & Cress. 254, one J. Williams was
on the jury panel, but did not appear, and his son R. H. Williams,
answered and was sworn: he was under age, and had not the property qualification. The indictment was for perjury, and Abbott,
0. J., in granting a new trial, seems to rely upon the impossibility
of a challenge by the defendant at the trial. In referring to Hill
vs. Yeate8, he says: "I am quite aware of the difficulty pointed
out by Lord Ellenborough, viz: that yielding to such an objection lays open a door to practice and collusion. It is necessary
to guard against them as well as we can, but I think we should not
be justified by an apprehension of mischief which may hereafter
arise, in saying that a verdict should be binding where a person
without practice of either party has appeared and served on the
jury, not having the requisite qualifications either of age or estate."
Bayley, J',says, "It is a mistrial; because none should serve save
those in the panel." The other judges also put it on the ground
"that no challenge could be taken."
This case, though the proper qualifications were wanting in the
person improperly sworn on the jury, which fact distinguishes it, to
till
vs. Yeates, was decided chiefly on the
some extent, from
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ground that a challenge could not have been taken, and certainly
shakes the authority of that case.
In The King vs. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cress. 417, where the objection to the juror was alienage, the refusal of the new trial was on
the ground that the right of challenge existed, and the opportunity
of making the objection earlier.
From this review of the cases, it appears that the'rule laid down
In M71 vs. Yeates, has not been strictly adhered to. Indeed, it is
not easy to comprehend the propriety of the rule which admits that
to be a mistrial, and remediable if discovered at any moment before
verdict actually given, but which, if discovered immediately after,
though it was impossible to ascertain it sooner, entitles the party to
no remedy unless at the discretion of the Court, in view of the justice of the case.
No American authorities have been referred to bearing upon the
point under consideration. There are several -which show the
necessity of. distinguishing between such irregularities as may arise
from the neglect or misconduct of officers or jurors, and those of a
more serious nature, which deprive a party of his legal rights.
Such a case is the The People vs. Ransom, 7 Wend. 417-to which
case our attention was directed by the District Attorney'since the
argument-in which Sutherland J., takes occasion to review the
doctrine of Hill vs. Yeate8, and remarks: " I must confess that
case carries the doctrine to an extent to which I should be unwilling to go. It appears to me to have been the verdict of but eleven
men; the twelfth man was no juror, he was not on the panel; he
was not the man intended to be summoned, nor was he even in fact
summoned." Also, "this case marks emphatically the strong
reluctance of that Court to interfere with a verdict of a jury
upon any objection of form not affecting the -substantial merits of
the case. With great deference and respect, however, I must say,
that I think the Court, in that case, pushed-the principle to a great
extent."
It thus appears that the doctrine, that an exception like the present, taken after verdict, can only be directed to the discretion of
the Court, and is not a claim of right-is not fully sustained in
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England, and is very strongly doubted here.

Judge Bell, in the

case of Com. vs. Scallager,4 Pa. L. Jour. 511, mentions the introduction of one not summoned into the jury box as a cause forinew
trial. This, though but a dictum, shows that the doctrine in question is not generally admitted.
Upon the whole case, therefore, we feel bound to regard the prisoner as having, wthout any default or waiver on his part, been
deprived of a right which the law gives to every man, which we as
its ministers, are bound to secure to him; that our duty does not
depend upon our discretion, nor is it to be guided by our views of
the justice of the case. The prisoner must have his legal' rights,
whatever we or others may think of his criminality, or however
difficult it may be, if guilty, to bring him "tojustice. Entertaining
these views, which seem to us the only safe ones in a case where
liberty and life are at stake, we feel bound to grant the application
for a new trial, and declare the~rule absolute.

Supreme Gourt of Maine, 1852.'
MOODY V8. BROWN.
1. The manufacture of an article, pursuant to the order of a customer, does not

transfer the title.
2. Neither does the tender of the article, when so manufactured, transfer the title.
3. Neither does the leaving with the customer against his will, of the article so
manufactured and tendered, transfer the title.
4. To pass the title, there must be an acceptance, either express or implied.
5. An action against the customer, as for an article sold and delivered, cannot be
maintained by the manufacturer, unless the articles have been accepted.
6. An exception to this rule obtains, when the customer employs a superintendent,
and pays for the property by instalment as the work progresses.
EXCEPTIONS from the District Court, HATHAWAY, J.
ASSUmPSIT, on a count for materials and labor furnished, and

ON

1From 34 Maine Rep. 107, with the sheets of which we have been favored by Mr.
Redington, the'Reporter, in advance of publicaticn.
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one on an account for articles sold and delivered. The account was
for stereotype plates, $18, alteration of same, $4, and some interest and expressage, making in all, $25 04.
A witness for the plaintiff testified, that in behalf of the plaintiff
he presented the bill and requested payment, to which the defendant replied, that he had ordered the plates, but did not feel able to
take them; that there was a mistake in them, which the plaintiff
was to correct at his own eipense; that he afterwards carried the
plates to the store of the defendant, who refused to take ihem ; that
he left them there against the remonstrance of the defendant; that
the defendant afterwards offered to pay $20 for the whole bill;
that, at a still subsequent period, the witness asked the defendant
when he would pay the $20, who replied that he would do it in a
few days; and, that the defendant afterwards repeatedly said he
would pay the twenty dollars.
The judge instructed the jury, that, if defendant contracted for
the plates to be made for him, and refused to accept them when
made, although he might be liable to plaintiff in an action for damages for not fulfilling his contract, yet he would not be liable in this
action for their value, as for goods sold and delivered; that, if they
were left at defendant's store against his consent and remonstrance,
such a proceeding on the part of plaintiff could have no effect to
vary the liabilities of defendant.
But if afterwards defendant offered to pay the twenty dollars in
full for the bill, and if that offer was accepted, the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover the twenty dollars and interest thereon from
the time such offer was accepted, but that defendant would not be
bound by that offer unless it was accepted.
J. B. GodfreY, for plaintiff.
.Where an agreement is perfoimed on one part, it cannot be repudiated on the other.
The tender of the plates was tantamount to a delivery, and the
rule of damages is the value of the plates, for which this action
was brought.
The case of Bement vs. Smith, 15 Wend. 493, is in point, and
conclusive for the plaintiff. It is identical with this,- except that
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here the goods were not only tendered, but left with the defendant.
18 Johns. 58; Strange, 506.
Simpson for the defendant.
The opinion of the Court, SHEPLEY, C. J., WELLS, RICE and
up by
not a perfect agreement of the decided
cases upon the question presented by the exceptions.
The law appears to be entirely settled in England in accordance
with the instructions.
Atklnson vs. Bell, 8 B. & C. 277; Blliott
vs. Pybus, 10 Bing. 512; Clarke vs. Spence, 4 Ad. & El. 448.
The case of Bement vs. Smith, 15 Wend. 493, decides the law to,
be otherwise in the State of New York. The case of Towers vs.
Osborne, Stra. 506, was referred to as an authority for it. Theplaintiff in that case does appear to have recovered for the value
of a chariot, which the defendant had refused to take. No question
appears to have been made respecting his right to do so, if he was
entitled to maintain an action.
Ther only question decided was,
whether the case was within the statute of frauds.
In the case of Bement vs. Smith, 0. J. SAVAGE appears to have
considered the plaintiff entitled upon principle to recover for the
value of an article manufactured according to order, and tendered
to a customer refusing to receive it.
This can only be correct upon the ground, that by a tender theproperty passes from the manufacturer to the customer against his.
will. This is not the ordinary effect of the tender. If the property
does not pass, and the manufacturer may commence an action and,
recover for its value, while his action is pending it may be seized
and sold by one of his creditors, and his legal rights be thereby
varied, or he may receive benefit of his value twice, while the customer loses the value.
The correct principle appears to have been stated by TINDAL, a..
J., in the case of Elliott vs. .Pybus, that the manufacturer's right
to recover for the value depends upon the question, whether the
property has passed from him to the customer. The value should
not be recovered of the customer, unless he has become the owner"
28
APPLETON, J. J., was drawn
SHEPLEY, C. J.-There is
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of the property, and can protect it against any assignee or creditor
of the manufacturer.
To effect a change in the property there must be an assent of
both parties. It is admitted, that the mere order given for the
manufacture of the article does not affect the title. It will continue to be the property of the manufacturer until completed and
tendered. There is no assent of the other party to a change of the
title exhibited by a tender and refusal. There must be proof of an
acceptance or of acts or words respecting it, from which an acceptance may be inferred, to pass the property.
This appears to be the result of the best considered cases.
There is a particular class of cases, to which this rule does not
apply, where the customer employs a superintendent and 1pays for
the property manufactured by instalments as the work is performed.
Exceptions overruled.

,Quarter Sessions of Erie County, Pennylvania. Feb. 1853.
COMMONWEALTH VS. MARTIN.
Since the Act of April 11, 1848, in Pennsylvania, the property of a married woman
is absolutely vested in herself, and hence, in a prosecution for larceny of wife's
property, such property must be laid in the indictment to be in the wife, or the
prosecution cannot be sustained.

This was an indictment for the larceny of a pair of gold specta-cles and a port-monaie, which were laid in the indictment as the
property of Hiram L. Brown. On the trial, the evidence proved
the spectacles to be the property of Mrs. Philena Brown, wife of
Hiram L. Brown, which fact was conceded by the Commonwealth.
The Court, GALBRAITH, Pres., instructed the jury that this was
a fatal variance, and that they must acquit the defendant of the
larceny of the spectacles; that the Act of 11th April, 1848, vested
the property of a married woman absolutely in herself-that the

